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ABSTRACT
To cope with the fast development of decentralized wire-
less communications, game theory has been considered as a
necessary and powerful mathematical tool to study the com-
petition and cooperation between future intelligent wireless
devices. This paper surveys the state-of-the-art of game-
theoretical tools applied to wireless communications, focus-
ing mainly on the analysis of wireless resource allocation
problems.
1. INTRODUCTION
It has been nearly one and half century since the in-
vention of wireless transmission using electromagnetic spec-
trum. From the early use of spark-gap telegraphy (1888, H.
Hertz) to the first clear transmission of human speech in air
(1919) and to the invention of frequency modulation (FM)
until the early form of mobile phone cellular networks (1947,
Bell Labs), wireless technologies and applications have been
greatly changed. However, interference is still a Pandora’s
box in the design and analysis of today’s multi-user wireless
systems.
In wireless communications, multiple access transmission
turns out to be a very common scenario, because (unlike the
wire-line communications) radio spectrum is a shared com-
mon resource in the sense that every user has the possibility
to transmit over it. Interference appears to be a problem (it
can even block the transmission process) when several trans-
mitters simultaneously access the same physical link. In this
case, receivers obtain a mixed version of all the transmitted
signals, and in general it is difficult and expensive to let the
receiver distinguish and capture its desired information.
The control and reduction of multiuser interference is a
fundamental problem in wireless communications. Many
media access technologies together with efficient resource al-
location algorithms have been introduced under this setting.
All these technologies can be briefly summarized from the
viewpoints of degrees of freedom:
• Frequency
Frequency Division Multiple Access (FDMA) is a chan-
nel access method which gives each user an individual
allocation of one or several frequency sub-bands (or
sub-channels).
FM broadcasting can be considered as a simple exam-
ple of FDMA.
• Time
Time Division Multiple Access (TDMA) is a channel
access method which allows several users to share the
same frequency channel by dividing the signal into dif-
ferent time slots.
TDMA technology is widely used in the digital 2G cel-
lular systems, e.g., IS-54 (1990) and GSM (1991).
• Code
Code Division Multiple Access (CDMA) is a channel
access method employing spread-spectrum technology
and a special coding scheme (where each transmitter
is assigned a code) to allow multiple users to be mul-
tiplexed over the same physical link.
CDMA technology leads GSM in migration to 3G,
e.g., IS-95B (1999) as 2.5G technology and CDMA2000
(2000) as 3G technology.
• Space
Space Division Multiple Access (SDMA) is a multi-
ple input and multiple output (MIMO) based wireless
communication technology. In traditional mobile cel-
lular network systems, in order to provide radio cov-
erage, the base station radiates the signal in all direc-
tions, since it has no information on the position of
the mobile devices within the cell. SDMA is an ad-
vanced channel access method which enables access to
a communication channel by identifying the user lo-
cation and establishing a one-to-one mapping between
the network frequency division and the identified spa-
tial location.
SDMA technology is considered as a key feature in 4G
cellular systems.
With the increasing demand of wireless voice and data
services, frequency spectrum has become a scarce resource
for which everyone fights for. In fact, the spectral efficiency
(efficiency measurement of using frequency spectrum) can be
improved by radio resource management techniques such as
efficient fixed or dynamic channel allocation, power control,
link adaptation and diversity schemes.
Over the past two decades, resource allocation based on
information theory [1] and optimization theory [2, 3] has
played a central role. For example, waterfilling algorithm [1]
is one of the most famous pioneering works that consider
how to maximize the channel capacity. However, in order to
achieve the information-theoretic limits (e.g., capacity re-
gion), it usually requires a central computing resource (a
scheduler with comprehensive knowledge of the network in-
formation) to globally schedule and allocate the system re-
sources. This process is centralized, it involves feedback and
overhead communication whose load scales linearly with the
number of transmitters and receivers in the network.
As the number of cells in the network increases, interfer-
ence becomes the bottleneck. In the current cellular wireless
arena, engineers frequently stumble on the scalability prob-
lem. As networks become more and more dense, classical
methods based on interference avoidance/cancellation and
techniques based on frequency and space reuse or power
control are not be able to cope with interference due the
increasing number of mobile terminals. The optimization
based centralized network infrastructure begins to expose its
weakness in many aspects, e.g., slow reconfiguration against
varying environment, difficulty in centralizing network infor-
mation, high cost of network operating expenses, increased
computational complexity, etc.
It turns out that due to the different nature of the mobile
devices as well as the high mobility of the network, future
wireless networks are going towards more self-organizing re-
source allocations schemes in which mobile devices intelli-
gently allocate resource in a decentralized manner [4]. In
recent years, there has been great research interest in self-
organizing wireless networks. Tools of game theory [5], as
borrowed from economics1, has emerged as an adequate frame-
work for the analysis of wireless network resource allocation
by modeling devices as selfish players.
2. TOOLS OF GAME THEORY
Game theory is a branch of applied mathematics that is
used in the social sciences, primarily in economics (in order
to model competition between companies), as well as com-
puter science, biology, politics and many other areas. Game
theory is a description of strategic interaction, which at-
tempts to mathematically capture behavior in strategic sit-
uations, in which an individual’s success in making choices
depends on the choices of others. It enhances the under-
standing of conflict by devising theories, mathematical mod-
els and abstractions that serve to explain the nature and
results of conflict.
2.1 Background
In game theory, there are some basic assumptions which
are often utilized to facilitate the construction of tractable
models for real situations. First, it is assumed that each in-
dividual (player) in the game has a definite ordering of pref-
erences over all outcomes of a given situation. These prefer-
ences take the form of a utility function (or payoff ). Second,
the participants in games are sometimes considered to be
rational. This means they always act in a way that maxi-
mizes their payoffs, they will always be capable of thinking
through all possible outcomes and choosing that course of
action which will result in the best possible outcome.
Thus, one way in which we can informally formulate a
game is as a situation where there exist K decision-making
entities or players (whose choices or actions) influence the
1In the famous literature The Wealth of Nations, Adam
Smith (A Scottish moral philosopher, pioneer of political
economy, father of modern economics) expounded how ra-
tional self-interest and competition can lead to economic
prosperity and well-being through macroeconomic adjust-
ments.
Figure 1: Two-user MAC
outcomes of that situation. A player “attaches” a utility to
each one of these outcomes and is motivated to act in a
manner that maximizes his utility, given the choices of his
opponents. This characterization of an K-player game is
known as the strategic form of a game. Strategic-form game
is an appropriate model to interpret the interaction between
decision-makers. The model captures interaction between
the players by allowing each player to be affected by the
actions of all players (not only the player’s own action). This
paper will mainly focus on the applications of strategic-form
games in wireless resource allocation problems.
2.2 A motivational example
What is a game problem? What can game theory tools
bring to us? To better understand the concepts and prin-
ciples behind game theory, we provide a simple example in
the context of wireless communications, as follows:
Imagine a two-user multiple access channel (MAC), Fig. 1,
in which two mobile devices (transmitters) x1 and x2 com-
pete to transmit their signals towards a single base station
(receiver) in a common wireless channel. There are two
choices for both users: either to transmit with low power
(denote by “Low”) or transmit with high power (denote by
“High”). They must decide simultaneously (without com-
munication) which power level to choose. Typically, this
problem can be modelled as a static game with three ele-
ments:
• A player set K = {x1, x2}.
• An action set Ak = {Low,High}, k ∈ K, which is the
same for both users.
• A payoff function set, which is described by the follow-
ing matrix2:
Low High
Low (win,win) (lose much,win much)
High (win much, lose much) (lose, lose)
where, in each entry (a, b), the values a and b represent the
payoff of player x1 and x2, respectively.
Intuitively, from this payoff matrix, we have the following
observations:
2Note that here we do not give specific values for the payoffs,
but show it in a “win-lose” terminology.
• If both mobiles choose to transmit with high power,
they will surfer from the increased interference caused
by the other one, which results in a “lose-lose” situa-
tion.
• If mobile x1 chooses to transmit with low power and
mobile x2 chooses to transmit with high power, com-
pared to the“lose-lose” case, mobile x1 will get a worse
performance (denote by “lose much”) and mobile x2
will benefit from the reduced interference and enjoy a
better performance (denote by “win much”).
• If both mobiles choose to transmit with low power, it
will result in a “win-win” situation.
Obviously, to find the solution of this problem is beyond
the capability of optimization theory, since user x1’s best
strategy depends on the strategy chosen by user x2, which
user x1 does not know, and reciprocally for user x2.
Readers may guess that both mobiles must strictly prefer
to transmit with low power. However, this “win-win” situa-
tion is not the solution of this game, i.e., it is not a natural
outcome of rational players. It might be quite surprising
that the only solution, the pure Nash equilibrium3, of this
game is the “lose-lose” situation.
2.3 Methodology to study game problems
In such a non-cooperative strategic-form game, what ac-
tions should the players choose? The famous Nash equilib-
rium represents a common solution concept that is mutual
optimal, in the sense that no player has any motivation to
deviate from it. In general, to analyze Nash equilibrium,
there are three main questions that should be considered,
which are “existence”, “uniqueness” and “selection”. Here,
we briefly discuss this methodology in general situations [6,
7],
1. Existence - Does an equilibrium exist?
2. Uniqueness - Does there exist a unique equilibrium or
multiple ones?
3. Selection - How to select a favouring equilibrium from
the equilibrium set?
“Existence” is the very first question that naturally comes
into our mind, since it is known that, in general, an equi-
librium point does not necessarily exist. Mathematically
speaking, proving the existence of an equilibrium is equiv-
alent to proving the existence of a solution to a fixed-point
problem [8]. Since the existence of the fixed-point hints that
there is some strategy set which is a best response to itself,
therefore no player could do any better by deviating, and so
it is an equilibrium. Fortunately, there are many scenarios
based on usual channel models and performance metrics (e.g.
Shannon transmission rate and rate regions have desirable
convexity properties [9] that are in favor of the existence of
an equilibrium [10]) where existing theorems are sufficient.
“Uniqueness” is the second fundamental problem that we
need to address when the existence is ensured. Ideally, we
would prefer there to be a unique equilibrium because it
is the simplest solution form for general game-theoretical
3A Nash equilibrium, named after John Nash, is a set of
strategies, one for each player, such that no player has in-
centive to unilaterally change her action.
problems, and it is important not only for predicting the
state of the network but also crucial for convergence issues.
Unfortunately, there are not so many general results on the
topic of equilibrium uniqueness. One could find some useful
results in the concave N-person games [10], where it is shown
that there exists exactly a unique equilibrium if the payoff
functions satisfy the condition of diagonally strictly concave
which can be easily verified.
However, there are many important scenarios where the
equilibrium is not unique, e.g., routing games [11], coordi-
nation games [12], non-cooperative games with correlated
constraints together with the concept of “generalized Nash
equilibrium” [13], etc. Natural questions that arise concern
the selection of an appropriate equilibrium, i.e.,
• What can be done when one has to deal with a game
having multiple equilibria?
• Are there some equilibria “dominating” others?
• Are there some equilibria more “fair” than others?
• What is a “good” selection rule to follow?
As a matter of fact, “equilibrium selection” is a mature
theory in itself [14]. But here, instead of paying attention
to the general theory, we are more interested in the applica-
tions of concave games, where Rosen has already introduced
the notion of “normalized equilibria” [10] that shows a very
neat way to tackle this selection problem. Obviously, the
selection rule is strongly related to the fairness criteria uses,
e.g., max-min fairness [15], proportional fairness [16, 17],
Jain’s fairness [18], global optimization and normalized equi-
librium, etc. Specifically, the authors of [7] have shown that
the max-min fairness, proportional fairness and normalized
equilibrium achieve the same rate allocation in the context
of multiple access channels with multi-user detection. Up
to now, equilibrium selection is still an open topic in many
communication network models and applications, especially
for the case of non-convex rate region, e.g., achievable rate
region of collision channels and interference channels.
3. GAMES THEORY IN WIRELESS COM-
MUNICATIONS
In recent years, there has been some great interest in self-
organizing wireless networks in which mobile devices allo-
cate resource in an intelligent way. There are three main
ingredients that make game theory to be a fruitful theory
for future wireless analysis and design:
1. Future generation wireless networks will most likely
consist of intelligent radio devices, capable to sense
the environment and effectively adjust their transmis-
sion parameters according to the current local channel
conditions and QoS specifications.
2. Wireless channel is considered as a shared common
resource (frequency, time, power, space, etc.) which
implies competition and cooperation between wireless
devices. In some sense, wireless resource allocation
will not be simply considered as an optimal way to
“share a cake”, but a complex resource conflict between
intelligent decision makers.
3. Wireless networks are highly structured which favors
the success of game theoretic analysis.
The decision makers in the game are rational users or net-
works operators who control their communication devices.
Indeed, game theory is an appropriate mathematical tool to
model the interaction and to solve the resource conflicts ex-
isting in the wireless networks. Here, we illustrate several
basic game theory tools that have already been used in the
literature.
3.1 Wireless game with complete information
We call it a game with complete information, if the game
structure (which includes play set, action set and payoff
functions) is available to all players. For example, “chess” is
a game with complete information, because the chess play-
ers, chess moves and each player’s objective are known to
all players.
Many efforts have been made in this direction, since it
is considered as an initial step. Game theory has been
widely applied to study the resource allocation and power
control problems in various types of networks, such as fad-
ing MAC [19], orthogonal frequency division multiplexing
(OFDM) [20], multiple input and multiple output (MIMO)
channels [21, 6, 22], and interference channels [23], etc.
The weakness of this game-theoretic approach is that the
game models used in these previous works assume that the
information/knowledge about other devices is available to
all devices. However, this assumption is hardly met in prac-
tice. In practical wireless communication systems, devices
can have local information but can barely access to global
information on the network status.
3.2 Wireless game with incomplete informa-
tion
In game theory, a strategic game with incomplete informa-
tion is called a“Bayesian game”. In contrast to games where
devices have complete information about other devices, it is
of great interest to investigate scenarios where devices have
“incomplete information” about their components. The no-
tion of“incomplete information”means that some players do
not completely know the structure of the game. For exam-
ple, “poker” is a game with incomplete information, because
players are uncertain about the card states of other play-
ers, therefore, the exact object functions of other players
are unknown.
Before talking about games with incomplete information,
we need to clarify two other similar notions: “imperfect in-
formation” and “imperfect (or partial) channel state infor-
mation (CSI)”. The former“Imperfect information”is a com-
mon notion used in the sequential games [5], in contrast to
games of perfect information, a game is said to have im-
perfect information if not all players know all moves that
have taken place (or the history of the game is not avail-
able to all players). The latter “imperfect/partial CSI” is a
specific term widely used in the wireless communication so-
ciety, it means that the channel information is not perfectly
estimated/observed at the transmitter/receiver side.
It is important to note that the assumption of incomplete
information is closely related to the two notions mentioned
above. For example: we can consider the following commu-
nication scenario with imperfect CSI as a game of incomplete
information: a device has perfect CSI about its own channel,
but it has imperfect CSI about any other device’s channel.
Note that this is a common situation that usually happens
in a wireless network, since it may be too “expensive” for
every device to keep track of the time-variant channels of all
other devices.
Unfortunately, in wireless communications, there are not
many references using Bayesian games to model and solve
the resource allocation problem. In [24], a static Bayesian
game-theoretic model is applied to the problem of trans-
mit power determination in the uplink of a self-organizing
CDMA wireless network. In another important work [25],
Bayesian game model is applied to study the two-user multi-
channel (or multi-carrier) interference channels, where each
wireless device selects a power profile over the entire avail-
able bandwidth to maximize its data rate. The authors show
that there exists a unique Bayesian equilibrium under the
assumption of single-user detector (each user treats inter-
ference as noise and no interference cancellation techniques
are used) and finite (typically selected) action set. In [26],
for multiuser fading MAC, under the assumption of discrete
(finite) channel states, the authors show that there exists ex-
actly one Bayesian equilibrium in the game. The efficiency
of Bayesian equilibrium is studied in their numerical results.
3.3 Wireless game via Nash bargaining
Nash bargaining is a natural framework that allows us to
define and design a fair assignment of wireless resource, e.g.,
transmission rate, between players which will play the role
of bargainers. It is characterized by a set of axioms that
are appealing in defining fairness or by a maximization of
log-concave function on the set of feasible sum-rates. Nash
bargaining solution (NBS) is an interesting solution concept
since it can be seen as a natural extension of the propor-
tional fairness criterion which is probably the most popular
fairness. In such a game, players are faced with the prob-
lem to negotiate for a fair point in the convex set of feasible
rates. If no agreement can be achieved by the players, the
disagreement utilities (sum-rate) is obtained.
In fact, NBS is applied widely in network resource al-
location. For example, in [27], a criterion based on NBS
is applied to orthogonal frequency division multiple-access
(OFDMA) networks. This method generalizes the propor-
tional fairness and increases the efficiency of the system.
In [28], the ideas of max-min fairness, proportional fairness
and NBS have been applied to the Gaussian multiple access
channel (MAC) and the Gaussian broadcast channel (BC).
Algorithms have been designed to locate the fair point in
the capacity region. In [29], cooperative game is used to
provide preferred points on the boundary of the achievable
rate region for a simple 2×2 interference channel. From their
simulation results, the cooperative solution NBS is shown to
significantly outperform the competitive NE. In [30], NBS is
studied as a tool to achieves point(s) on the Pareto frontier
of the game theoretical rate region under asymmetric condi-
tions for OFDM hot-spot networks. A stochastic algorithm
is proposed.
4. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have discussed the use of game theory
in future wireless network. From a simple motivational ex-
ample, we showed what is a game problem and we discussed
the methodology to analyze the solution of a game problem.
We have summarized several game theory tools that can be
applied to study the wireless resource allocation problems.
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